The much talked about Philadelphi corridor has been making the rounds in a new turn of events after the Israeli Prime minister has expressed his fears that the Israeli hostages might be smuggled across the tunnels underneath the corridor into Egypt, but the same sources claim that the IDF has found no evidence of this either happening in the present or the future, nor that it happened in the past.
The same sources claim that this is being pushed forward as a sort of justification for the Israeli army’s presence there and insistence for keeping the corridor out of the question in the negotiations for ceasefire. These negotiations, however, have hit rock-bottom after Hamas has stated that it now seeks a permanent ceasefire, changing the deal from a 6 week pause in fighting as previously discussed. This indeed has led many close to the process to believe that the chances for a negotiated pause are close to 0.
The first week of August registered a tragedy when a protester of US origin was declared a casualty in West Bank following the suppression of the protests by the IDF – the event was deemed as “unjustified and unprovoked” by the US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, who followed-up by stating that the security forces must make a fundamental change in their rules of engagement. Israeli officials have released statements evidencing their regret for the “unintended and indirect fire”.
Exchanges between Hezbollah and Israel keep taking place in North Israel and South Lebanon, respectively, while the later is not the only are which is being targeted. Due to greater technological possibilities which the IDF possesses, it is capable of reaching much further targets than their rivals – the latest evidence of this has been recorded by a strike against a car which recorded a Hezbollah casualty in central Lebanon.
The IDF also claims it has successfully targeted a senior official of the Elite Radwan Forces in south Lebanon. As in all cases, there is a high enough chance that this is proven true by the retaliatory rockets which the terrorist group launches against Israel right after, which seems to be the case. Some 45 of these have been launched targeting the northern Israel on August 10, without any casualties being recorded, sources say.
In any case, from the latest statements by Israeli officials, it seems that the focus might shift from southern Gaza, towards the north of it and, according to Gantz, to Lebanon as well. Gallant has also deemed that Hamas, as a military force, has been neutralized and also looks for this shift.
If indeed the IDF will move closer to the Lebanon border, with talks about a ground operation into Lebanon also being vehiculated, then this war can see new developments. For the moment, such a scenario seems less likely due to the capacity of Israel being limited in fighting on three fronts, considering that such maneuvers would be considered offensive in nature and not defensive as it has been the case in past wars when Israel was mostly on the defensive.
As wars go and as an accepted general theory, a three to one ration must be held by the attacking side in comparison with the defending side so as to be considered enough for the reaching of their goals. This takes into account that the IDF would be operating in three hostile areas, in Gaza where it is fighting a protracted guerilla war with Hamas, the West Bank where it must operate on a daily basis, also fighting a sort of urban guerilla warfare close to the one being fought in the Gaza Strip and a potential ground invasion of Lebanon against an organized and sufficiently armed foe, while also operating airstrikes in Syria and other areas and maintaining deterrence and security inside Israel itself while also dealing with large scale protests.
All this considering and as we have stated before in other articles, this scenario seems to bear a low chance of happening, although it is not a complete exclusion.